I repeatedly read or hear someone singing the praises of analysis based on “connecting the dots.” When I taught a graduate seminar on National Intelligence at George Mason University in my opening remarks, I told the students that the only certain way of failing my class was to say out loud or insert into a written assignment the phrase “connecting the dots.” I consider elevating this approach to analytical tradecraft dangerous especially in the absence of a robust research effort, one that unfortunately doesn’t exist currently.
Despite my concerns, current intelligence analysts too often rely almost exclusive on this questionable methodology. They wait for dots to appear in the tsunami of information that comes across their desks every day, connect them with similar dots they remember seeing earlier and then write up a current intelligence report. If they are lucky their article may make it into the President’s Daily Brief (PDF). I should caution you that few current reports are based on anywhere near the number of dots pictured in my “connecting the dots” graphic. Most are based on five or fewer dots with no guarantee that they are all connected. Little wonder our analysis is often wrong and disregarded by policymakers who want new evidence not opinions.
Five deadly sins of “connecting the dots”
(Lessons that should have been learned from Iraq WMD)
(1) Never enough dots
(2) Can just as easily connect bad or
misleading dots as good ones
(3) Easy to miss good dots on the margins
(4) Some good dots are considered irrelevant
(5) Some irrelevant dots are considered good
The key to producing better quality current reporting can never be achieved by just connecting the easily identifiable dots (what I call the obvious bits and pieces) that come streaming in every day. Far too many dots go by unnoticed (what I call the less obvious ones). Others stream by completely unrecognized (what I call the hidden dots). Thus, our guesstimates, even by the most skilled current reporters, appear to policymakers as mere opinion not evidence and as a result it rarely causes them to challenge their own strongly held beliefs. Intelligence officers should also never forget that policymakers often read or are briefed on the same obvious dots directly from collection agencies even before they receive the current analyst’s written report.
The key lies in identifying the less obvious and hidden data lying fallow in the gigantic haystack of information that grows bigger with each new collection cycle. The solution is not rocket science. Analysts need to apply research methodologies to harvest new understanding from the haystack. In doing so they create new knowledge (more good dots) for the current analysts to use in their reports. Don’t forget intelligence analysis is no different than any other field of study such as history, medicine, biology, or physics. CNN’s Dr. Gupta does a remarkable job of explaining current medical events, but no one would ever expect him to find a cure for cancer. Only teams of researchers have a chance of pulling off such a miracle. For intelligence analysis we need both teams of researchers and current reporters.
Unfortunately, the senior managers of the Intelligence Community (IC) long ago decided to put all their eggs in the current intelligence basket. Research offices were dismantled, and their analysts let go or were put to work doing current reporting. Although we have many smart, capable analysts with all of them doing current reports, a tremendous amount of duplication of effort exists. More importantly “connecting the dots” can’t answer most of the policymakers’ principal questions. Until we recognize this and rebuild our research capabilities, we will continue to make mistakes both small and large like India going nuclear, the WMD fiasco, and the more recent misjudgments of Russian military capabilities and Ukraine’s willingness to resist. These are the very reasons we invest so much money in intelligence – no more Pearl Harbors or 9/11s. Instead, we do the easy things and completely ignore addressing the hard questions and mysteries that abound.
If there is to be change, three long held views need to be reviewed and revised:
(1) Many believe you can solve the problems ailing the IC with more and better collection. I’ve overheard conversations of technical collectors, for example, making the absurd claim that we really don’t need analysis just more collection. This of course is garbage, but since few, if any, senior managers have ever been research analysts and many come from the collection world or current intelligence, they don’t have a clue on how to improve the quality of what they are producing. More collection is good, but it doesn’t solve the problems ailing the IC.
(2) Closely related is the belief that more and better human intelligence (HUMINT) is the answer. Wish it were true. For one it suggests that the HUMINT collectors haven’t been working hard enough and can do better. What gets lost in this debate, of course, is the historical record of our efforts to recruit agents inside our key adversaries – not so good. HUMINT is hard. We have been working at it for a long time. I’m sorry, but you can put as much money into HUMINT as you want; it is not going to make much of a difference. Truth is that luck more than the number of case officers, determines the amount and value of most HUMINT collection.
(3) Finally, we have reached this point because too many managers believe that if an analyst is not working on something for the President, he or she is not doing anything important. Hence their rationale for making all analysts current reporters. You don’t have to look far to realize how well that philosophy has worked out. They are correct in pointing out that the President is our primary consumer. What they seem to miss is that it is the quality of the information in the PDB, not the number of current reports produced, that counts. It is my strongly held belief that you could reasign ¾ of the analysts at CIA and DIA to staff a renewed emphasis on research tomorrow without anyone knowing you had made the change until they began to see the improvement in the quality of the reports they were receiving. There is this amount of duplication of effort on current reporting today.
Unfortunately, I see little chance that the IC is prepared to change. The most highly touted recent reforms of the IC after 9\11 and Iraq WMD merely moved the deck chairs around on the Titanic. We are still sinking. Until we recognize the importance of quality over quantity and reestablish a robust research capability there can be no saving us. Brace yourself for the next big mistake.
For the doubters with security clearances, they need only ask the IC to share with them the orders-of-battles of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran produced by DIA and CIA. My guess is that they don’t exist. Yet, to do any high order analysis on our adversaries’ military capabilities such basic research is essential. Admittedly, any fix will not come easy, but it will at least not require any extra expenditures. What is called for is simply moving the deck hands and those in the bowels of the Titanic to new assignments. The next time you hear some promoting “connecting the dots” remember that instead of the solution it is the crux of the problem with intelligence analysis.
I love it. I'm trying to remember who first thought up the stupid idea but it sure caught on.
I'd add one more fault. Assume the game is multidimensional. Then where do you go with that thread?