DANGEROUS THINKING

Chas Freeman,^[i] in a series of recent speeches, later turned into published essays, revisits his position of fifty years ago that Taiwan isn’t worth fighting over. Instead, he supports policies that pressure Taiwan to seek an accommodation with China. For example, he says:

“Until recently, Beijing and Washington honored diplomatic understandings that, backed by superior American military power, preserved the peace in the Taiwan Strait. More recently, as those understandings have withered and U.S. military supremacy has eroded, both China and the United States have come to treat the Taiwan issue as a casus belli.”^[ii]

These understandings that Chas is talking about were kept secret from the Congress and the American people for over a decade when they finally appeared in the Third Sino-US communique in 1982.

“Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.”^[iii]

These assurances in all likelihood were originally given to Mao Zedong by President Nixon in 1972. Chas served as the President’s interpreter during this historic trip. Unfortunately, for Chas and others at the Department of State when it came time to normalize relations with Beijing a few years later, the enabling act which they delivered to Congress was dead on arrival in both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Both committees rejected the Executive Branch’s proposal as deficient in many areas because it did not provide for a workable framework for conducting a wide range of unofficial economic and military relations with Taiwan. Instead, the committees started over from scratch developing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that stated:

It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area.

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.^[iv]

The Third Communique attempted to undue the TRA and return to President’s Nixon’s promises made in 1972, especially an end to all arms sales. In the process it was obviously hoped that such an action would force Taiwan to negotiate a settlement with Beijing. Fortunately, when President Reagan’s national security advisor on Asia, Gaston Sigur, explained to the President what State had convinced him to sign, he asked Gaston to prepare a memo for the record that outlined his view on arms sales. The memo contradicts the views expressed in the Third Communique by stating that US arms sales to Taiwan will be determined by the actions of the Chinese and it is our intent to maintain a military balance in the strait. In short, should the PRC increase its capabilities to take Taiwan by force, we would seek to match them with our own arms sales. If the memo was not enough, the President subsequently gave Taiwan six assurances -- Declassified cables, sent in 1982 from the State Department, detail them:

1.     The United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.

2.     The United States has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.

3.     The United States will not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.

4.     The United States has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.

5.     The United States has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.

6.     The United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.^[[v]]

Both the Senate and House of Representative passed concurrent resolutions in support of the six assurances in 2016 going further in a number of instances than those promised by President Regan.^[vi] These aren’t the diplomatic understandings Chas is talking about. He would have us go back to the promises President Nixon made to China in 1972 undoing not only the TRA but President’s Regan’s interpretation of the Third Communique, his six assurances, and the Congressional concurrent resolutions. He makes his recommendations knowing that after China’s actions in bringing authoritarian rule to Hong Kong no one in Taiwan trusts the PRC to live up to any promises it might make.

But it is not just Taiwan he isn’t willing to fight for. He also would have the US disengage from the Pacific entirely.

“Many assume that if the U.S. were to withdraw its commitment to military primacy in East Asia (as it seems to be doing both economically and politically) or to back off its current support for Taiwan’s indefinite separation from the China mainland, China would dominate the region. But this ignores the nationalism of both northeast and southeast Asian societies as well as the natural opposition of India to any such outcome.” ^[vii]

First off, the US is not withdrawing, “its commitment to military primacy in East Asia” and Chas knows this not to be true. Indeed, we are publicly shifting our attention away from the Middle East and putting much more emphasis on the Pacific and China in particular as a “strategic competitor.” Nor is the policy of the US to maintain Taiwan’s “indefinite separation from the China mainland” only that it is up to the people of Taiwan to make such a decision. It is theoretically possible, however unlikely as it seems today, that changes on the mainland could make it possible that some sort of settlement might then become acceptable to the people on Taiwan. He is also wrong in assuming that any of our allies and friends in the Indo-Pacific favor a US withdrawal. Certainly not South Korea. In the case of Japan, its increases in defense spending and reconsideration of its strategic posture are not a hedge against a lessening of interest on the part of the US, but in reaction to the military build up in China. By the same token, the new basing arrangements in the Philippines and Australia are strong indications that these countries want the US to remain forward deployed in Asia as well. Again, because all of them know that without the US “… China would dominate the region.”^[viii] Many of our friends in Southeast Asia and India feel the same. What is most startling is that Chas, a China expert, could make three exaggerated, or at minimum misleading statements, in one sentence. Shame on him.

The notion that the countries in the Indo-Pacific absent the US would organize themselves into some NATO-like framework to keep China at bay again makes no sense and Chas knows this too. He must believe that China would not fill the vacuum left from a US withdrawal, or more likely he doesn’t care. This is at best dangerous thinking and at worst Chas is looking not to lose any friends, financial or otherwise, in China.

 Yes a war with China would be catastrophic for both countries. On that point I agree with Chas. Yes, we and the people on Taiwan should do nothing that would prompt military action such as a declaration of independence by Taipei nor should Washington take any action that undermines the unofficial relationship for dealing with Taiwan established in the TRA. Members of Congress, in particular, must recognize that in showing their support for Taiwan, especially those actions that give the appearance of pressing for a more official relationship, could be the catalyst for Beijing deciding that the use of force was necessary.

Indeed, I find the whole notion of preparing to fight a war with China as wrongheaded. Our objective and preparations should be for deterring Beijing from believing that a use of force, either a blockade or an all-out invasion, would succeed. The worst-case scenario for China is to start a war but find itself stalemated. Such a situation could also prompt a succession struggle. In the case of the US military, I’m afraid it will need to totally rethink its response to a Chinese use of force. The idea that we are going to come steaming into the region with our aircraft battlegroups planning to use brute force to defeat Chinese forces, including striking targets on the mainland of China, is a prescription for disaster. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been preparing for such an eventuality for over forty years. It wants to fight our forces up close. It could inflict astronomical casualties and its greatly increasing nuclear capability would likely cause any President to pause before authorizing “going downtown” on the China mainland unless the PRC had previously attacked US forces on Guam, or those in Japan, the Philippines, or Australia.

Our whole focus should be on actions that deter China from ever contemplating the use of force. As one author, Robert Haddick has put it, our primary objective should be to “kill the Chinese Navy.”^[ix] Most people agree that achieving a successful amphibious invasion is the single most difficult military operation imaginable. The fight should focus on increasing Beijing’s odds that they could not succeed in pulling off such an operation. As Haddick points out, this will require the US Air Force to greatly increase its procurement of long-range SLBMs and the completion of the B-21 program even at the cost of delaying the purchase of such things as fighter aircraft. Much the same goes for Taiwan. Many in Taiwan’s senior military leadership still favor buying big ticket items – aircraft and naval vessels – that will not survive even the first day of a conflict with China and they continue to resist the asymmetrical war plan adopted by the Taiwan government. This plan focuses on keeping the PLA from gaining a foothold on the island, including among other things smart mines, stinger missiles, more Apache helicopters, increasing the size and capability of Taiwan’s reserve forces, and building mobile missiles that survive the first onslaught and reappear aimed at destroying China’s navy before it even reaches the beaches.

Overcoming our own Air Force brass’s priorities will require considerable effort by any President. He or she will definitely need the full support of the friends of Taiwan in the Congress. Unless they work together, the services will continue to put their priority on adding more hardware at the expense of providing the missiles and other kinds of ammunition needed to deter Beijing from even considering the use of force. Sometimes those who should know better lose sight of how important logistics are in winning any conflict. But, should deterrence fail, our focus should be on destroying the Chinese navy in the Taiwan strait before it can put even one soldier on the island. Friends of Taiwan will also have to play hardball with Taipei. We should emphasize arms sales that support the asymmetric war plan adopted by the Executive Yuan and discourage purchases that wouldn’t last a day in a war with China. In short, we need to focus on deterrence over warfighting and insist that Taiwan do the same.   

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^[i] To learn more about Freeman checkout Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chas_W._Freeman_Jr..

^[ii] “Why Taiwan’s dependence on the US is not a safe bet,” Responsible Statecraft, December 27, 2022.

^[iii] Third SINO-US Communique, August 17, 1982.

^[iv] Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), February 1979.

^[v] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Assurances#cite_note-5.

^[vi] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Assurances#cite_note-5.

^[vii] “How the US and China can shape a new East Asian Order, together” RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT, DECEMBER 29, 2022

^[viii] “How the US and China can shape a new East Asian Order, together” RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT, DECEMBER 29, 2022

^[ix] Robert Haddick, “Defeat China’s Navy, Defeat China’s War Plan,” War on the Rocks, September 21, 2022.