DETERENCE! DETERENCE! DETERENCE!

China/Taiwan an Epiphany

I recently realized that over decades my vision of what an attempt by China to take Taiwan by force might look like was wrong. Most importantly, because of my background as an intelligence officer Blue Forces never factored directly into any of my simulations. I paid much less attention to what the Commander in Hawaii might be thinking, and always attempted to visualize such an operation from the perspective of China’s General Staff. Accordingly, I viewed the primary objective of such an attack as speed. That is: Get forces on Taiwan before the US has time to marshal its considerable military capabilities in the Pacific. For me it is much easier for a US president to say that he or she will defend Taiwan, but quite another matter if China already controls the island and has put its own local puppets in power. Indeed, for the past 30-40 years I believe the PLA has developed its forces with such a scenario in mind. Plus, the General Staff has put particular emphasis on defeating the US when it did eventually show up with its aircraft carriers and other naval combatants. Myself along with many others believed that despite our best intentions in such a situation we would be unable to pry China from Taiwan once it controlled the island and might not even try. Most importantly, the consequences of a war with the PRC are so grave that nobody in their right mind wouldn’t seek to avoid such an outcome. Instead, the name of the game is deterrence, and if possible even more deterrence.

The most recent revision of my view began after Robert Haddick’s defeat the navy article.¹ His emphasis on fighting the PLA from a distance makes much more sense to me than what I imagine the US Indo-Pacific commander has in mind. I’m particularly drawn to it because it provides a capability that the PLA is not counting on. The Chinese want to fight us in close. That is what they have prepared for. They anticipate our carriers to come steaming in after they are already on the island and believe they can win such engagements. Recent war games seem to echo that conclusion with the US losing two aircraft carriers during a recent simulation. Fighting them from a distance, however, puts Beijing at a disadvantage. Unfortunately, I sometimes think that Congress, the Services and the defense industry have bought into the approach the Chinese favor – more slowly involving ourselves in the conflict as we build up our forces in the region. It helps explain our continued emphasis on more aircraft and ships to the exclusion of everything else in the defense budget. We have only so many dollars to spend. They appear to have a deaf ear when it comes to what we really need – more long-range munitions. Why don’t they receive a high priority in the most recent House of Representative military appropriations bill? If we can’t fix such an easily identifiable problem, how in the world are we expected to compete with a strategic competitor such as China. We apparently don’t yet see the advantage of fighting from a distance. Instead, all signs suggests that we still have our head in the sand. Hopefully, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party will put the issue of munitions on its agenda soon.

Like many others I believe the PRC assumes that the US would at some point come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an attack, however, probably not until, as the thinking goes, it had marshalled sufficient forces to prevail in a major conflict with the PLA. But where I erred most in my thinking was how Beijing might view US forces based in Japan and on Guam. Even in a take Taiwan quickly plan, I think the PRC anticipates these forces would be immediately available and could prove decisive in upsetting the PLA’s ability to navigate the 100 miles or so of the Taiwan Strait even before the bulk of US forces arrive. This suggests that any prudent PRC leader contemplating an attack on Taiwan would of necessity have to consider preemptive strikes on these US forces so close to the action. In doing so, however, he would create the almost inevitable employment of any remaining nearby US, and possibly Japanese, conventual forces, and put his country on a track for nuclear escalation. Thus, beyond the inherent difficulties of an amphibious operation, the early introduction of US forces in the conflict would complicate the PRC’s confidence of a successful assault and increase deterrence.

The third element of my changing appreciation for the complexities of a China/Taiwan scenario concerns the role of the US Army in all this. Where is it? Although there are promising signs coming from the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Center that is in the process of building up its intellectual capability on China, there is so much more that the Army could, and should, be doing right now. Maybe it is because all things Indo-Pacific belong to the commander in Hawaii, always a Navy admiral, who has his Marines for ground forces duties in the region, or because the Army is more focused on Korea? I don’t know. What I do know is that Taiwan is in desperate need of leadership and technical advice in implementing its new asymmetric national strategy that many in its navy and air force continue to resist. Here the Army should take the lead. Training of reservists and thinking through the potential mobilization of a large segment of the population for a war as in Ukraine are best done in my mind by the Army not the Marines. The same for hiding mobile ground forces, munitions, and other supplies that can contest a landing assault at a distance, by continuing to shoot and scoot even as the more conventional air and naval forces are destroyed in the first hours of a Chinese attack. Indeed, as I have written earlier, Taiwan should consider putting more emphasis on buying Apache helicopters than it does on F-16s. In addition, in- country production of Stinger missiles makes a lot of sense to me, as does purchasing long range artillery and the ability to produce the munitions for such weapons on the island creating the conditions for stockpiling arms and munitions in a variety of different locations. All such initiatives cry out for a greater US Army role in establishing deterrence.

Such an involvement need not involve large numbers of US troops stationed on Taiwan. It does, however, require the Army Chief of Staff playing a more important role in all things to do with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) envisions allowing some trainers temporarily separated from government service to operate on the island, as the Department of State has accomplished successfully from the beginning. Neither is there any prohibition from having Taiwan’s officers and soldiers training in the US. Both should be greatly increased. Ditto for frequent secure communications between senior Army leaders of both countries. The Army should become the head cheerleader in both Washington and Taipei for Taiwan’s porcupine strategy, its asymmetric qualities providing the greatest degree of deterrence for Beijing to worry about. It also fits well with the US fighting from a distance, while avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese mainland.  Our intention being to kill the PLA’s invasion force while avoiding if at all possible moves that could prompt nuclear exchanges.

I know there are many out there who believe that all this could best be avoided by the US writing off Taiwan. No risk of war, especially a nuclear holocaust for them. I couldn’t disagree more. Nixon kowtowing to Beijing, followed by several administrations attempting to remake China as a responsible member of the existing world order haven’t worked. If anything, such policies have only increased the PRC’s desire to bring the island under its control as it has done in the case of Hong Kong. Even if there are those who can swallow abandoning the 23 million people prospering in one of the world’s most dynamic democratic societies, it is hard not to believe that such a decision would almost certainly lead to a much-diminished role for the US in all of the Indo-Pacific and create the conditions for China possibly assuming leadership of a new international system at our expense.

Since I fear a nuclear holocaust as much as anyone but am unwilling to walk away from our commitments to the people on Taiwan, the answer for me has been and will continue to be deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. I just wish others would adopt the ideas of fighting from a distance, killing the PLA Navy, insist the US Army play a more significant role in our Taiwan strategy, assist Taipei’s implementation of its asymmetric strategy, and encourage Taiwan to

quit putting so many resources into air and naval assets that will likely be destroyed in the first hours of a Chinese attack.