A Sad Tale[1]
I finally got around to reading Nancy Bernkoph Tucker’s classic detailed study of US, Taiwan, and China relations, “Strait Talk,” a few weeks ago only to find that I didn’t know nearly as much on the subject as I thought I did. Indeed, I literally kicked myself for coming so late to a book that dramatically changed my opinion of the US’s handling of its interactions with China vis a vis Taiwan during times I was directly involved in following China/Taiwan issues. Having contributed to the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff in 1979, sitting through the Executive Branch’s closed-door explanation of the 2ndCommunique in 1982, and experiencing first-hand the Department of State’s reluctance to provide appropriate arms sales to Taiwan while seconded from CIA to OSD/ISA during Bush 1, the more I learned from Nancy’s book the angrier I became. Not only had the people at State mislead and outright lied to me during the 1970’s and 1980’s about their understandings with China concerning Taiwan, but they also kept the truth from my bosses Senator John Glenn, Wild Bill Casey, and Dick Cheney among others.
Beginning with the Nixon/Kissinger opening to China in 1971-1972, that striped Taiwan of its ties to the United Nations, I believe our actions can best be described as kowtowing to China. I found the promises made to the Chinese by Kissinger who I now refer to as the “weasel,” in preparation for President Nixon’s visit, particularly disturbing. Fortunately, his more egregious misstep – agreeing that Taiwan was a province of China – could be walked back a bit, but his willingness to accept almost any Chinese demand in 1972 including eventual abrogation of the US-Taiwan security treaty and an end of arms sales, set the parameters for all Executive Branch decisions concerning Taiwan until recently.
The Carter/Brzezinski normalization of relations agreement in 1978-1979, and the Reagan administration’s 1982 2nd Shanghai Communique were simply attempts to formalize the weasel’s promises. The 1982 Communique came closest to giving Beijing what it thought had been promised 10 years earlier. Fortunately, Gaston Sigur serving on the NSC for Asia at that time interceded with President Reagan to interpret the document as requiring that the US maintain a military balance in the Strait until a truly peaceful settlement between China and Taiwan could be achieved. This intersession and the President’s six assurances[1] to Taiwan completely undermined State’s attempt to resurrect the Kissinger formula especially in terms of arms sales.
Nixon-Kissinger followed by subsequent administrations also created the notion of “strategic ambiguity” which they proclaimed publicly would deter China from attempting to take Taiwan by force. The Chinese, so they said, couldn’t know for certain the US wouldn’t intervene. This policy was sold ironically as supportive of Taiwan. In private neither believed that Taiwan could withstand PRC pressures to unite with the mainland after the Shanghai Communique. They also weren’t bothered by this prospect. Many Department of State officers and academics felt the same way and continue to do so today. “Strategic ambiguity” gives them the opportunity to avoid saying publicly what they were thinking privately then and now – Taiwan isn’t worth defending.
To be fair the authoritarian regime established by Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 and continued by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, until his death in 1988 probably wasn’t worth fighting for. By the mid 1970’s, however, glimmers of more democracy for native Taiwanese were readily apparent. Legislative members serving under the banner of “no party,” who were certainly not in agreement with the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), spoke out against martial law and pressed for greater freedom of the press. Even Chiang Ching-kuo’s hand-picked successor to head the KMT turned out to be a native Taiwanese.
I remember visiting a hardline Mainlander’s home in 1975-1976 where I spotted opposition magazines on a coffee table in the living room. When I asked my host who they belonged to, he frowned and said: They belong to my son. That same desire for democracy proliferated among later generations of Mainland children, most considering themselves more Taiwanese than Chinese, has only intensified.
Formosa, what the late Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) used to refer to Taiwan when meeting with PRC officials – driving them crazy – no longer suffers under an authoritarian dictatorship. Taiwan’s 24 million people rate higher on a democracy scale that does the US. As others have advocated[1]the time has come to end the “weasel’s’ notion of “strategic ambiguity,” and adopt as President Biden has done, an era of “strategic clarity.” Taiwan is worth fighting for.
[1] I am indebted to the late Nancy Bernkoph Tucker’s classic detailed study, “Strait Talk: United States - Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China.” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England, 2009, and my own experiences on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff contributing to the TRA and reactions to the 1982 Communique for inspiring me to write this brief essay.
[2] “We have not agreed to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan.”
“We have not agreed to prior consultation on arms sales.”
“We have not agreed to any mediation role for the U.S.”
“We have not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.”
“We have not agreed to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. ”
“The PRC has at no time urged us to put pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC; however, we can assure you that we will never do so.” Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2020.
[3] Richard Haass and David Sacks, “The Growing Danger of U.S. Ambiguity on Taiwan: Biden Must Make America’s Commitment Clear to China—and the World,” Foreign Affairs, December 13, 2021
Carl, excellent post. Your "weasel" has a pattern of realpolitik over the years to advocate that the US walk away from nations we support - RVN was first, then Taiwan as you've covered, and now Ukraine with his recommendation to let Russia keep what they already have to accept a ceasefire.