A friend recently shared with me an article focused primarily on the mistakes the Intelligence Community (IC) made prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It makes several important points,[1] but when it mentions China's poor performance in its Vietnam incursion in 1979, apparently based on the large personnel losses it suffered, the author demonstrates his lack of understanding of the PLA and China. Judging the success or failure of the operation on high casualty losses in this case was misguided at the time and continuing this myth over forty years later is an even graver error in 2022.
DIA knew in the several years before the operation that the ground forces eventually used in the operation had become proficient in its use of combined armed operations through yearly exercises - infantry, armor, artillery, and airborne infantry at the division level and higher. So, there should be no doubt that the PLA knew how to organize and implement an attack to take territory or even make a run at Hanoi in 1979. A few weeks before launching the attack during a meeting with several PLA officials in Beijing when the issue of Laos came up a senior officer interrupted the conversation by slamming his fist on the table and shouting emphatically to me and others in attendance, "We must punish Vietnam!” The other officials nodded their heads in agreement.
The incursion that followed a few weeks later looked nothing like the training we had been observing by these troops for several years previously. Instead, the ground forces lined up at every conceivable crossing point into Vietnam and on the command to go moved forward killing, burning, and destroying anything in its wake including Vietnam's border troops and main force units it encountered. It was about as clear a demonstration of punishing someone as I can think of.
Yet for those watching closely, like those in Moscow, it was clear that China in initiating an attack did not have their sights set on Hanoi or occupying Vietnam. They simply intended to "punish" the Vietnamese for their expansionistic activities especially in Laos. A few months after China's lesson given to Vietnam, Hanoi moved its troops out of Laos. True the operation cost China high casualties, but it is also clear that Beijing achieved its strategic goal regarding Laos. Instead of mirror imaging how the US would have reacted to such losses – seeing it as a failed operation – policymakers in Washington should have learned that Beijing is prepared to pay high casualty costs to achieve its foreign policy and strategic goals. Although the myth of the PLA’s poor performance in 1979 persists, we should not let it cloud our vision when considering the Taiwan issue and how it is perceived in Beijing in 2022.
[1] Robert McKeown, “Assessing Military Capability: More than Just Counting Guns” December 2022, Proceedings, Vol. 148/12/1,438
It should have been evident from China's intervention in the Korean War that it had no concern about taking high casualties in pursuit of strategic or even tactical objectives. The one asset China always has in spades is manpower it is willing to expend for political purpose.or to save face, which may be the same thing. The most recent exhibit: Xi's Zero-Covid policy.
Really interesting material, and convincing. What does it say though about China's lack of offensive intentions? It could take Hanoi but didn't want to. At least compared to the US, it hasn't much engaged outside its territory, and when it has, Korea by far the biggest case, one could argue it was to prevent hostile powers on its border. Tibet might be a counter to that idea, and potentially Taiwan, but we were in Tibet causing a lot of trouble and now with Taiwan. This shouldn't be surprising or honorable in any way, just a reflection of having so many real and potential enemies all around its huge territory.