The events of the past week in the Middle East prompted renewed questions about intelligence warning and who was at fault – intelligence officers or the policymakers. The whole conversation demonstrates the utter lack of understanding of warning on the part of the general public and amazingly even of most government officials in and out of the Intelligence Community (IC). Roberta Wohlstetter’s 1962 classic book, “Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision,”[1] has provided the intellectual foundation for the study of warning ever since, and led to the well-worn adage that the primary function of the IC is insuring that there are no more Pearl Harbors. Indeed, that objective has dominated the policy and allocation of resources even before, but especially after the publication of the book.
Leaders concluded that to avoid such a disaster the IC must collect more and more “signals” of all types. This view has persisted despite the long list of failures over the ensuing years. Although 9/11 is the most outstanding example, our recent judging that the Russians would take Kiev in three days and Ukrainians would not put up much resistance, demonstrate that the IC remains welded to the notion of quantity over quality. Instead of focusing on our mistakes and making positive changes, we have compounded our error by dismantling virtual all of the research capability once possessed by the IC that might I have made a difference beginning with William Casey’s reorganization of CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence in 1981.
A closer study of Wohlstetter’s book suggests and answer. She concludes:
If our intelligence systems and all our other channels of information failed to produce an accurate image of Japanese intentions and capabilities, it was not for want of the relevant materials. Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy. And perhaps never again will we have such a magnificent collection of sources at our disposal. [Emphasis Mine][2]
Yet we doggedly continue to focus on the quantity of collection, and more recently have turned to AI hoping it is the ingredient we have been missing. AI in the hands of narrowly focused watchers, a key requirement for creating an expert, may help in sorting through the tsunami of data collected every day. I’m less certain that we will find discovering answers for the problems of where and when any easier to detect. Moreover, we don’t have narrowly focused experts anymore, and there are no signs that this is about to change. Moreover, plunging ahead putting AI in the hands of the generalists now reporting on the IC’s daily mail makes me cringe.
As an analyst, I was taught that there are two kinds of warning intelligence:
· Strategic Warning -- Former DCI George Tenet’s repeated warnings to senior leaders that there was a high probability that there would be a terrorist attack on the US,[1] although ignored by the policymakers, is a classic example of strategic warning, and
· Tactical Warning -- Is far more specific and can be directed at a warfighter as well as a senior policymaker. It includes information on the perpetrator – the who – what is going to happen, where it will occur, and most importantly when. Without this degree of specificity, it is difficult, if not impossible for policymakers or warfighters to take decisive action. Unfortunately, history suggests that achieving such details are rare, and most often a result of luck.
I believe using these distinctions when thinking about warning, leads to a better understanding of the challenges facing both intelligence officers and policymakers alike. It certainly helps put 9/11 in perspective. Although red lights were blinking wildly, the IC couldn’t provide credible evidence where an attack might occur and especially when such an event would happen. Without such details no president would order the grounding of all aircraft even for a day.
Hamas’s attack on Israel contains many of the same problems the US faced prior to 9/11. Although it is not clear how many lights were blinking prior to 7/10 for Mossad and Shin Bet, it is hard to believe that such highly professional and experienced officers manning these organizations did not recognize the general threat posed by Hamas and were not watching events in Gaza and the West Bank most carefully. Again, Wohlstetter helps us in understanding what the Israelis may have experienced. She underlines:
… the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior. If one is listening for signals of an attack against a highly improbable target, then it is very difficult for the signals to be heard…. Apparently human beings have a stubborn attachment to old beliefs and equally stubborn resistance to new material that will upset them.[3]
I can only speculate, but from what we know now, something like this may have been at work in Israel. Interestingly, in 1973 Israel had been provided details of an impending Egyptian attack but read it as a training exercise because its leaders could not conceive of Cairo being so stupid.
In sum, I can’t fault Israel’s intelligence for missing signs that Hamas was about to attack. Tactical warning is hard. But I must admit to being a bit surprised given the small area to cover and the intense collection efforts focused on it. If it turns out the policymakers had the when and where and just did believe it, however, then shame on them.
Frankly, what I find more worrisome than a lack of warning is the time it took for Israel to react to the attack. Based on 60 Minute’s reporting it took some 10 to 12 hours for military or police forces to reach one of the hardest hit settlements. Worse still civilians seeking to reach their relatives were often hindered in bringing help by government roadblocks and orders to stay away. Fortunately, for this one family their relatives would not be deterred, and arrived in time to drive away Hamas’s fighters still attempting to kill or capture anyone they could find. I guess that this issue, more than warning, will cause considerable blow back on the government.
[1] Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1962.
[2] Ibid. P. 382
[3] Ibid. PP. 392-393
In what the late Saddam Hussein once dubbed “the great Satan,” roughly two-thirds of the United States enlisted military corps is white . . . The fat, bulbous U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin once confirmed in a 93-2 vote of the U.S. Senate, immediately embarked on a whirlwind media tour of duty, telling the pseudo-secular sycophants in the state-controlled tabloid press and state-controlled television talk show circuit about how the U.S. Army is full of bad racist white men.
Senior Defense Department leaders celebrating yet another Pride Month at the Pentagon sounding the alarm about the rising number of state laws they say target the LGBTQ+ community, warned the trend is hurting the feelings of the armed forces . . . “LGBTQ plus and other diverse communities are under attack, just because they are different. Hate for hate’s sake,” said Gil Cisneros, the Pentagon’s undersecretary for personnel and readiness, who also serves as DoD’s chief diversity and inclusion officer.
And now the U.S. Army is doing ads begging for more young white males? What happened?
Even with a full-on declaration of war from Congress, and even if Gavin Newsome could be cheated into the Oval Office by ZOG somehow, with Globohomo diversity brigades going door-to-door looking to impress American children into military service, they will be met with armed, well-trained opposition, the invasion at the Southern border is going full tilt, and the drugs are flowing in like never before.
Get ready for it . . . the fat old devil worshipping fags on Capitol Hill, on Wall Street, in Whitehall, and in Brussels are in no shape to fight a war themselves, and most Americans are armed to the teeth with their own guns . . . NATO hates heterosexual white men . . . they said so themselves . . .
https://cwspangle.substack.com/i/138320669/nato-an-anti-white-and-anti-family-institution
Very thoughtful.