SPEAKING “TRUTH TO POWER”
(Truth that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality. noun: the truth "tell me the truth" Similar: the fact of the matter)
I must have said the phrase – “Speaking Truth to Power” – hundreds, if not thousands of times over my career in explaining the role of intelligence analysts, with not a small amount of pride in my chosen profession. What a crock! Indeed, on reflection I view such a mantra as emblematic of what ails the Intelligence Community (IC) today. It neither adequately explains what an intelligence analyst should be doing nor demonstrates how policymakers use information they receive from the IC.
Any analyst who insists that he or she has discovered the “truth” of something should immediately be removed from the IC or given a job that keeps them as far away from policymakers as possible. Given that we haven’t being doing any serious research for over 40 years, it is a stretch for an analyst even to claim the discovery of new knowledge let alone the truth of something. Today’s analysts deal in opinions, or I think, certainly not truths. Although our analysts are exceptionally bright people they are only reacting to classified collection reports, combined with their background knowledge and unclassified reports they have read. Much of this may be useful to policymakers, but no one should confuse what they are providing with anything close to the “truth.” For me, the mantra should be replaced with “Providing Evidence to Policymakers.”
For an intelligence analyst, important discoveries occur most often when a new piece of evidence suggests that their current assessment is likely wrong. Changing one’s mind or modifying one’s view is not only acceptable, but the mark of a good analyst. Not so for policymakers. They may use information provided by the IC in developing their views of how the world works and how they explain new events, but once they have taken a position publicly they are loath to change their view even in the light of new information. From that point on, you often find them accepting information that supports their previous public statements and rejecting anything that even suggests they rethink their position. They are particularly unimpressed with opinions from the IC and find them the easiest to disregard. What they find most troubling is new evidence, particularly when it is not just one new piece of information, but a series of pieces that caused the analyst to alter his or her view. In my own case in dealing with policymakers, I would start with “boss, you are not going to want to hear what I have say but let me lay out the evidence I’ve pieced together and then you decide whether it is worth considering.”
Policymakers make policy not analysts. Yet in my career, I’ve known more than my fair share of analysts who thought otherwise and attempted to influence policy changes with their advice. In fact, it usually has the opposite effect. Once a policymaker detects that an analyst is dabbling in policy rather than intelligence there is usually one of two results. If the advice supports the policymaker’s viewpoint, it will be added to the policy’s rationale. If not, the policymaker will take note and view any future think pieces by that particular analyst as tainted and automatically dumped into the burn bag regardless of its real value. In truth the executive branch has more than enough policymakers. What it desperately needs is more intelligence analysts helping those who make policy better understand the many complicated problems they face. Our job as analysts is to help make policymakers smarter with well sourced evidence – providing evidence to power – not just the latest news and our opinions. Anything less is simply not acceptable.
Just saying.
Thank you, Carl. My impression is that our political leaders are generally pretty good at political analysis and often want to be their own analyst. As human beings, if they are not treated with due respect, they tend to disregard the disrespecting person. Diplomacy is important within bureaucracies too.