Asking Whether the US Will Come to the Aid of Taiwan in the Event of an Attack is Asking the Wrong Question

I’ve recently noticed several Taiwanese wondering on LinkedIn if the US would really come to their aid in the event of an attack by China. Others are making wild guesses on when a war might start. This particular malady appears to afflict Americans as well as those in Taiwan. Determining what might happen tomorrow is at best merely a guess. Projecting such conjecture out over the next few years requires hard work – detailed research – that no one in government has been doing for 30 or 40 years. The odds on the accuracy of such wild guesses given these circumstances reminds me more of an unexpected belch or spending ten dollars on a slot machine anticipating winning a jackpot. I think all such talk misses the key strategic challenges. First and foremost, no one should harbor any doubt that gaining control over the island is a Chinese imperative. Nothing the US and Taiwan can do to change that. Taiwan and the US, however, can increase the cost of an amphibious assault on the island. That must be done now and over the next several years not once hostilities begin.

My observations of developments in the PLA over the past 40 years suggest to me that Beijing has been intent on developing a force that could quickly gain control over the island in order to complicate Washington’s response. It is one thing to decide to intervene before the PRC gains a foothold on the island than it is when deciding after forces are in Taiwan attempting to quell political demonstrations and already mounting military efforts at avoiding a prolonged guerrilla war.

Indeed, what worries so many people today is that Beijing’s investments in its military’s quick strike capabilities have become quite impressive. But such a force and a desire to capture the island in my mind are not enough. Most military experts I’ve consulted consider an amphibious assault is, even under the best of conditions, the most complex operation imaginable. Even when the US was at the height of its amphibious capability in World War II and planned in detail for an assault of Taiwan to rid it of its Japanese occupiers, it was decided, in the end, that the costs would be so great as to put in jeopardy the potential ability to assault the Japanese home islands. Taiwan was bypassed and the US’s march northward toward Japan continued. Today, in this regard I think one should keep in mind the scale of effort required for the D-Day invasion when considering the effort involved in a Chinese use of force. I have no doubts that the Chinese General Staff understands the complexity of such an operation and are keenly aware that its worst-case scenario would be to start a war but not be able to achieve its objectives in a timely manner. If one accepts this judgment our key strategic concern should be complicating Beijing’s calculations – deterrence – not specifically warfighting.

In such a scenario the key imperative is what Taiwan, and the US do prior to an attack that counts most. I’ve purposefully put Taiwan first because I believe that its actions more than anything the US can or will do are key to increasing deterrence. The people of Taiwan, whatever their political persuasion, must accept that their actions, far more than anything the US can do, are essential to avoiding a war with China. I believe many already do, but I haven’t seen the commitment and sacrifices by either political party to move from acceptance to action. Without such a change it greatly limits what the US can do and increases the prospect of a miscalculation by the PRC.

The list of actions that Taiwan must make are both long and expensive, but they must be made if the island wants to continue an independent existence from the mainland. Notice that I did not mention a formal declaration of independence which is clearly a red line for Beijing and one that Taipei should not cross. So, too is it vital that Washington maintain the “unofficial relations” established by the Taiwan Relations Act even as the restrictions and slights this causes are a slap in the face that wound the Taiwan’s people’s pride. Fact is that virtually any kind of support given to Taiwan by the US can be done in the guise of “unofficial relations,” including arms sales and the necessary training on US weapons, warfighting concepts, and communications. It just takes a bit more forethought and effort.

If I were Taiwanese my list of recommended actions would be a long one.

1.    I would double the size of the island’s military as soon as possible.

2.    Along with the increased size I would extend the length of service to two years. As I recall in years past graduate study abroad was limited to those that had completed their tour of active duty. If I’m mistaken, I would recommend such a requirement be instituted.

3.    Build secure fuel and ammunition depots in the mountains stocked sufficiently to sustain the military’s combat capability for an extend period of time.

4.    Make proficiency in English an important consideration for promotion in all branches of the military.

5.    Next I would arrange with Raytheon for permission to manufacture stinger missiles in Taiwan.

6.    Similarly, such an arrangement should be made with Lockheed and Raytheon to produce Javelin surface-to-air missiles on the island.

7.    These two initiatives should be combined with an effort to vastly increase the number of personnel in the reserves that can effectively use such weapons.

8.    As a high priority I would put a hold on all purchases of big-ticket items such as high-performance aircraft, major naval combatants, and submarines. Despite the Taiwan Military’s obsession with such purchases, recent unclassified wargames strongly suggest that such items would be lost in the first hours of a Chinese assault thus making them unavailable during the crucial stage when the PRC is seeking a foothold on the island.

9.    Emphasis should be placed instead on weapon systems that complicate an amphibious assault such as smart landmines that can be turned on and off, the co-production of Lockheed’s HIMARS artillery system and tanks where appropriate.

10.For similar reasons the ROC Air Force should transition from a reliance on fixed wing aircraft to the US Army’s Apache Helicopters operated out of a sufficient number of tunnels in the mountains – complete with fuel and ammunition – to make it difficult for the PRC to know on any given day where the helicopters might be hiding.

11.Make advance plans for destroying all port facilities and airfields once the PRC has gained air superiority over the island.

What my list for the US lacks in length it makes up for by its strategic importance.

1.    Both the Executive Branch and the Congress must accept that making Taiwan feel good by moving away for a strict adherence to “unofficial relations,” is strategically unwise, or as one might say in Arkansas just plain old dumb. It is unnecessary to provide Taiwan with everything it needs to defend itself and moving away from it could provoke the war we are trying to avoid. Be suspicious of anyone, especially in the Congress, who attempts a counter argument. They simply haven’t thought enough about the consequences.  

2.    Washington must insist that US support depends on Taiwan acting on a list of recommendations devised by the Pentagon not unlike the one presented above.

3.    Increase the allotment for Taiwanese students to attend the US military academies.

4.    Similarly, the opportunity for Taiwanese officers to attend all US military schools and colleges should be expanded.

5.    The US should facilitate the acquisition and/or co-production on an accelerated basis of key weapon systems such as Stinger missiles, the Javelin surface-to-air missile, HIMARS, smart landmines, and Apache Helicopters.

6.    Most importantly the US must shift its thinking of coming to Taiwan’s assistance based on how we fought the Gulf War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan. The PLA has been built explicitly to limit the effectiveness of such tactics. The Chinese want to draw us in close where they believe the PLA can best fight us and win. Instead, our side should focus on destroying the Chinese Navy using only submarines in close and mostly fighting from a distance using long range bombers and smart air to surface missiles. This will require a radical change in the US Air Force’s acquisition priorities particularly in terms of smart munitions.

7.    You undoubtedly noticed that I made no mention above of attacks on the Chinese mainland something many seem to believe will be necessary if deterrence fails. I think such thinking is not the answer and if it continues to guide our reaction to the Chinese use of force it almost ensures an all-out war that could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, I view the 300 or so new ICBM silos, potentially housing missiles with up to three warheads each, as Taiwan related in the minds of the Chinese leadership. They likely see them as complicating Washington’s calculus on how or even whether to intervene at all. Any war plan that anticipates attacking targets on mainland China when these missiles are in place will greatly complicate any President’s decision making on how to react to an assault on the island.

Just saying.

Looking forward to your comments and thoughts. I never envisioned my SubStack articles as a one-way street. They were written in the hopes that they would provoke a discussion on various topics. I treasure each of the comments you have made. Looking forward to hearing from you on this one.