Thank you! We are now visiting my wife's family in Nantou County, Taiwan. I recently asked a retired Taiwan noncom about the recent extension of Taiwan's draft by a year. He told me:
-- Taiwan's draft needs to be for two to three years: training in a military specialty takes at least 1.5 years. Having college students fulfill their one year during summer vacations (4 x3) would not be effective.
-- There are many consequences of a military expansion not being thought through and addressed, including scaling up training, current pay scales for volunteers, now that draftees got a big jump in compensation, that could affect morale.
I saw an article in Taiwan Times 台湾时报 about Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. I got it on Amazon -- only $10 in Chinese; someone said on Twitter that a US university press has plans to have it translated. The fourth chapter of Lee Hsi-ming’s book discusses on American attitudes on Taiwan, the American degree of commitment, U.S. reliability and the debate over whether ‘strategic ambiguity’ with regards to what would be the U.S. reaction of China should attack/reclaim its wayward province concludes that Taiwan must depend first upon itself and then hope for American assistance to help make a Mainland China attack on Taiwan too costly to be contemplated or to succeed.
David, thanks very much for your comments and the sources on your blog. Keeping telling it like it its.
My problem with the notion of strategic ambiguity is that I am old enough to remember when it was first devised. Its initial supporters were to a person opposed to coming to Taiwan's assistance. It was a way for them to avoid admitting in public that they weren't prepared to come to Taiwan's aid under any circumstances -- maybe we would/maybe we wouldn't. They didn't have to commit.
I look forward to the complete translation of Admiral Lee's book. As you can imagine, I think he is on the right track.
Thank you, Carl. I didn't know that. I have always assumed that it was a matter of not unnecessarily sticking our finger in the PRC's eye and giving them something of a cause for going to war, thus preventing more normal relations.
I think the current shift in Taiwan's defense policy should make support for Taiwan easier politically in the United States. A Taiwan that looks like it is willing to fight for itself down to the last American seems less worthy of U.S. support (and indeed much more difficult to support if a conflict does arise) than a Taiwan working at building up a robust defense force.
A superb analysis, particularly in making the crucial distinction between when should and can be done without escalating the surrounding political rhetoric and the kind of feckless declaratory policy statements that only serve to provoke without paving the way for any concrete US actions. One added and important element, of course, is the pursuit of complementary, concrete improvements in our alliance cooperation with Japan and South Korea that both enhance their security, improve the US reach, and complicate the Chinese calculus regarding Taiwan.
Much appreciated and agree wholeheartedly with your comment about Japan and South Korea. Similarly, I would add Australia to that list of alliance members, especially now that we are operating B-52s from there.
Thank you! We are now visiting my wife's family in Nantou County, Taiwan. I recently asked a retired Taiwan noncom about the recent extension of Taiwan's draft by a year. He told me:
-- Taiwan's draft needs to be for two to three years: training in a military specialty takes at least 1.5 years. Having college students fulfill their one year during summer vacations (4 x3) would not be effective.
-- There are many consequences of a military expansion not being thought through and addressed, including scaling up training, current pay scales for volunteers, now that draftees got a big jump in compensation, that could affect morale.
I saw an article in Taiwan Times 台湾时报 about Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. I got it on Amazon -- only $10 in Chinese; someone said on Twitter that a US university press has plans to have it translated. The fourth chapter of Lee Hsi-ming’s book discusses on American attitudes on Taiwan, the American degree of commitment, U.S. reliability and the debate over whether ‘strategic ambiguity’ with regards to what would be the U.S. reaction of China should attack/reclaim its wayward province concludes that Taiwan must depend first upon itself and then hope for American assistance to help make a Mainland China attack on Taiwan too costly to be contemplated or to succeed.
On my translation blog I translated a review of 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win” and a short excerpt from the book 2022: Taiwan Chief of Staff’s “How Taiwan Can Win” https://gaodawei.wordpress.com/2023/01/18/2022-taiwan-chief-of-staffs-how-taiwan-can-win/
David, thanks very much for your comments and the sources on your blog. Keeping telling it like it its.
My problem with the notion of strategic ambiguity is that I am old enough to remember when it was first devised. Its initial supporters were to a person opposed to coming to Taiwan's assistance. It was a way for them to avoid admitting in public that they weren't prepared to come to Taiwan's aid under any circumstances -- maybe we would/maybe we wouldn't. They didn't have to commit.
I look forward to the complete translation of Admiral Lee's book. As you can imagine, I think he is on the right track.
Best regards.
Carl
Thank you, Carl. I didn't know that. I have always assumed that it was a matter of not unnecessarily sticking our finger in the PRC's eye and giving them something of a cause for going to war, thus preventing more normal relations.
I think the current shift in Taiwan's defense policy should make support for Taiwan easier politically in the United States. A Taiwan that looks like it is willing to fight for itself down to the last American seems less worthy of U.S. support (and indeed much more difficult to support if a conflict does arise) than a Taiwan working at building up a robust defense force.
Best regards,
David
Couldn't agree more with your last comment.
A superb analysis, particularly in making the crucial distinction between when should and can be done without escalating the surrounding political rhetoric and the kind of feckless declaratory policy statements that only serve to provoke without paving the way for any concrete US actions. One added and important element, of course, is the pursuit of complementary, concrete improvements in our alliance cooperation with Japan and South Korea that both enhance their security, improve the US reach, and complicate the Chinese calculus regarding Taiwan.
Much appreciated and agree wholeheartedly with your comment about Japan and South Korea. Similarly, I would add Australia to that list of alliance members, especially now that we are operating B-52s from there.