I’ve recently noticed several Taiwanese wondering on LinkedIn if the US would really come to their aid in the event of an attack by China. Others are making wild guesses on when a war might start. This particular malady appears to afflict Americans as well as those in Taiwan. Determining what might happen tomorrow is at best merely a guess. Projecting such conjecture out over the next few years requires hard work – detailed research – that no one in government has been doing for 30 or 40 years. The odds on the accuracy of such wild guesses given these circumstances reminds me more of an unexpected belch or spending ten dollars on a slot machine anticipating winning a jackpot. I think all such talk misses the key strategic challenges. First and foremost, no one should harbor any doubt that gaining control over the island is a Chinese imperative. Nothing the US and Taiwan can do to change that. Taiwan and the US, however, can increase the cost of an amphibious assault on the island. That must be done now and over the next several years not once hostilities begin.
Thank you! We are now visiting my wife's family in Nantou County, Taiwan. I recently asked a retired Taiwan noncom about the recent extension of Taiwan's draft by a year. He told me:
-- Taiwan's draft needs to be for two to three years: training in a military specialty takes at least 1.5 years. Having college students fulfill their one year during summer vacations (4 x3) would not be effective.
-- There are many consequences of a military expansion not being thought through and addressed, including scaling up training, current pay scales for volunteers, now that draftees got a big jump in compensation, that could affect morale.
I saw an article in Taiwan Times 台湾时报 about Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. I got it on Amazon -- only $10 in Chinese; someone said on Twitter that a US university press has plans to have it translated. The fourth chapter of Lee Hsi-ming’s book discusses on American attitudes on Taiwan, the American degree of commitment, U.S. reliability and the debate over whether ‘strategic ambiguity’ with regards to what would be the U.S. reaction of China should attack/reclaim its wayward province concludes that Taiwan must depend first upon itself and then hope for American assistance to help make a Mainland China attack on Taiwan too costly to be contemplated or to succeed.
A superb analysis, particularly in making the crucial distinction between when should and can be done without escalating the surrounding political rhetoric and the kind of feckless declaratory policy statements that only serve to provoke without paving the way for any concrete US actions. One added and important element, of course, is the pursuit of complementary, concrete improvements in our alliance cooperation with Japan and South Korea that both enhance their security, improve the US reach, and complicate the Chinese calculus regarding Taiwan.
Thank you! We are now visiting my wife's family in Nantou County, Taiwan. I recently asked a retired Taiwan noncom about the recent extension of Taiwan's draft by a year. He told me:
-- Taiwan's draft needs to be for two to three years: training in a military specialty takes at least 1.5 years. Having college students fulfill their one year during summer vacations (4 x3) would not be effective.
-- There are many consequences of a military expansion not being thought through and addressed, including scaling up training, current pay scales for volunteers, now that draftees got a big jump in compensation, that could affect morale.
I saw an article in Taiwan Times 台湾时报 about Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. I got it on Amazon -- only $10 in Chinese; someone said on Twitter that a US university press has plans to have it translated. The fourth chapter of Lee Hsi-ming’s book discusses on American attitudes on Taiwan, the American degree of commitment, U.S. reliability and the debate over whether ‘strategic ambiguity’ with regards to what would be the U.S. reaction of China should attack/reclaim its wayward province concludes that Taiwan must depend first upon itself and then hope for American assistance to help make a Mainland China attack on Taiwan too costly to be contemplated or to succeed.
On my translation blog I translated a review of 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win” and a short excerpt from the book 2022: Taiwan Chief of Staff’s “How Taiwan Can Win” https://gaodawei.wordpress.com/2023/01/18/2022-taiwan-chief-of-staffs-how-taiwan-can-win/
A superb analysis, particularly in making the crucial distinction between when should and can be done without escalating the surrounding political rhetoric and the kind of feckless declaratory policy statements that only serve to provoke without paving the way for any concrete US actions. One added and important element, of course, is the pursuit of complementary, concrete improvements in our alliance cooperation with Japan and South Korea that both enhance their security, improve the US reach, and complicate the Chinese calculus regarding Taiwan.