(Apologies for my lack of sharing ideas on foreign policy and intelligence in recent weeks. I enjoy contributing to SubStack, but illness in the family directed my attention elsewhere. Fortunately, matters are much improved.)
Two articles caught my attention recently. The first comes from my favorite China watcher, Malcolm Riddell, the author of the CHINAMacroReporter. The second appeared in the recent addition of International Security VOL 48 by Michael Beckley a professor at Tufts University. Both fall into the category emblematic of a practice I learned as a young analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency – beware of becoming too wedded to your latest and greatest judgement on anything. Ever since I have made it a practice to always be especially on the alert for any information that undermines or conflicts with my understanding of a problem – in this case my assessment that the predictions China could well launch an assault or blockade in the short term were overblown, and did not fully take into account Beijing’s understanding of the complexity of such operations or its appreciation that such actions could greatly increase the likelihood of a major conflict with the US and Japan among others.
Malcolm first caught my attention in his August 24 edition of his Reporter. He wrote:
Because the stakes over Taiwan are so high, it’s worth asking:
What if one leader or the other were to act outside what we consider the ‘rational actor model’? (More on that model later from a great essay in Foreign Affairs, ‘The Unpredictable Dictators: Why It’s So Hard to Forecast Authoritarian Aggression.’)?
For our discussion today, though, let’s just ask about one side: What if that leader is Mr. Xi?
What if - based on flawed views of China's military capability, bad intelligence, or a misreading of Taiwan and U.S. intentions – or just an impulse – Mr. Xi orders the blockade or invasion of Taiwan?
All our careful analyses of PLA capabilities, the parsing of Mr. Xi’s and Mr. Biden’s statements, the predictions as to the year of the invasion, everything – all out the window.
This is one you won’t see coming – but one you have to have prepared for.[i]
Maybe others picked up on this possibility along with Malcolm, but I must admit it was an eyeopener for me, and one that I must keep in mind for future assessments.
Not long after reading Malcolm’s comments the Summer Edition of International Security arrived in the mail. Michael Beckley contributed the first article in the journal entitled: The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China’s Next Decade. The first thing that caught my attention was his judgement that:
Peaking powers have lashed out when they realized that they would not catch their rivals or achieve their grand ambitions – unless they took drastic action.[ii]
The first thing that popped into my mind of course was China and Taiwan. So too must it have been for Michael as well because he continued on the next page that:
… China has entered a perilous period: it has acquired the means to disrupt the existing order, but slowing growth is narrowing its window to act. As a brutal dictatorship facing rising international protectionism, China is a high-risk case for an aggressive response, and its belligerent and expansionist behavior since its growth started to slow in the 2010s could be just a preview of what is to come if its economy stagnates in the years ahead.[iii]
Wow! The notion that Xi may not be a classic rational actor, something certainly not contradicted by his actions in recent years, and the widely reported signs of China’s economic woes suggest that I must factor these possibilities into my thinking about China and Taiwan. They certainly impact the confidence I have in any assessments I might make. On reflection, however, these insights do not change in any meaningful way the two factors that I believe weigh heavily in China’s thinking about taking Taiwan by force.
1. An amphibious assault of the island, an action something on the order of a D-Day plus in size and complexity, would run a high risk of failure, and I believe give pause to even an irrational actor giving such an order. Although not nearly so complex, a blockade for its part would not be easy, and as in the case of an assault, almost certainly prompt intervention by the US and others.
2. Given the inherent difficulties of either action China would almost certainly consider primitively striking US targets in Guam and Japan insuring a wider war involving not just the forces on Taiwan. Such strikes would also introduce the prospect that the conflict might not remain solely conventional. Also, while Beijing’s current efforts to reduce the impact of the anticipated international sanctions ameliorates somewhat the damage to the economy, there are no easy answers to the disruption of imports, especially oil and gas, that will surely come.
Accordingly in the short term, I still maintain that an attempt to take Taiwan by force or blockade the island remains low unless Taipei does something stupid like declare its formal independence or Washington does something equally stupid such as move away from the informal relationship established by the Taiwan Relations Act. With that said, I will watch China’s economic situation much more closely, and keep a closer eye on Xi’s antics.
[i] Malcolm Riddell, CHINAMacroReporter, August 24, 2023.
[ii] Michael Beckley, The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China’s Next Decade, International Security, VOL 48, Summer 2023, p.11.
[iii] Ibid, p. 12.
Carl: You suggest that Xi might order an attack on Taiwan as a result of "flawed views of China's military capability, bad intelligence, or a misreading of Taiwan and U.S. intentions." But there is also the very real possibility that he would do so with a full understanding of the circumstances and the risks--and a willingness to accept those risks--because of a domestic political imperative to act in defense of Chinese sovereignty and the legitimacy of the CCP. His rational actor model might be different from ours.