(Apologies for my lack of sharing ideas on foreign policy and intelligence in recent weeks. I enjoy contributing to SubStack, but illness in the family directed my attention elsewhere. Fortunately, matters are much improved.) Two articles caught my attention recently. The first comes from my favorite China watcher, Malcolm Riddell, the author of the CHINAMacroReporter. The second appeared in the recent addition of International Security VOL 48 by Michael Beckley a professor at Tufts University. Both fall into the category emblematic of a practice I learned as a young analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency – beware of becoming too wedded to your latest and greatest judgement on anything. Ever since I have made it a practice to always be especially on the alert for any information that undermines or conflicts with my understanding of a problem – in this case my assessment that the predictions China could well launch an assault or blockade in the short term were overblown, and did not fully take into account Beijing’s understanding of the complexity of such operations or its appreciation that such actions could greatly increase the likelihood of a major conflict with the US and Japan among others.
Carl: You suggest that Xi might order an attack on Taiwan as a result of "flawed views of China's military capability, bad intelligence, or a misreading of Taiwan and U.S. intentions." But there is also the very real possibility that he would do so with a full understanding of the circumstances and the risks--and a willingness to accept those risks--because of a domestic political imperative to act in defense of Chinese sovereignty and the legitimacy of the CCP. His rational actor model might be different from ours.
Carl: You suggest that Xi might order an attack on Taiwan as a result of "flawed views of China's military capability, bad intelligence, or a misreading of Taiwan and U.S. intentions." But there is also the very real possibility that he would do so with a full understanding of the circumstances and the risks--and a willingness to accept those risks--because of a domestic political imperative to act in defense of Chinese sovereignty and the legitimacy of the CCP. His rational actor model might be different from ours.