Taiwan Update

With so much talk about Taiwan I thought it time to share my near term (out 5-10 years) and long-term predictions (10-15 years) of China’s possible actions regarding the democratic island nation. Despite all the headlines and worry about China’s take aways from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Nancy Pelosi’s expected visit, my bottom-line assessment remains the same — rather optimistic.

Near Term – 5-10 years

I do not believe that in the near term – the next 5-10 years – China will decide the time has come to attempt to take Taiwan by force. Despite the significant improvements in the PLA’s capability over the past 25-30 years, and much of this has been designed specifically with Taiwan in mind, the General Staff recognizes the difficulties associated with an amphibious invasion. Too many things could go wrong even if you factor in only a minimal US response. Plus, President Biden has made it clear that the US would intervene should China launch an unprovoked invasion of Taiwan. There have been similar rumblings out of Tokyo and Canberra. Beijing has been put on notice.  

Of course, the Chinese could copy the Russian approach of destroying the civilian infrastructure and many of the people on the island along with it, but this makes little sense. Unlike the Russians they cannot then just drive across a land border. An amphibious assault would still be required. Also, half the population could hold up in the mountains on the eastern side of Taiwan for an extended period making an occupation costly and impractical. And what would the PRC expect to gain from destroying what makes Taiwan great; then end up suffering what could be quite serious economic sanctions? Plus, China doesn’t have the oil resources to offset its losses in world trade that Moscow has. All bets are off, however, should Taipei declare its independence or if the US appears to have restored some of its official relations with the island. Unfortunately, I can’t rule out stupid in either capital.

Long Term (out 10-15 years)

Predicting the long term is more worrisome. Assessing what a government may do tomorrow is difficult enough. Add 15 years on to that and estimates quickly become mere guesstimates with conclusions easily far off the mark. I still remember in horror my last China estimate as NIO for East Asia at CIA. The supposed China experts of the intelligence community drafted a paper predicting a high probability for political stability in China well into the future. At the coordination session for the estimate a young man, I suspect he was a foreign service officer, a back bencher who couldn’t even manage a seat at the table, asked to be heard. I recognized him. He indicated that he had spent the last three years in Beijing with a responsibility to keep in touch with college students. He suggested that based on his recent conversations he believed there was more ferment within the society than forecasted in the estimate. You would have thought he had uttered a curse word. All the experts laughed loudly, told him he was mistaken, and suggested not so politely that he might not be asked to accompany his bettors to the next meeting. As you may have already guessed, six months later I found myself recommending to Secretary of Defense Cheney that considering the PLA’s role in the Tiananmen Massacre he should suggest to the President that the only way to save even a portion of the US relationship with China was to immediately pull the plug on the extensive military-to-military ties that had developed between the two countries since normalization. He did and the President agreed.

I belabor the point about the inherent weakness of estimates as a cautionary tale for you to consider in reading my own long-term prognosis for the future of Taiwan, say over the next 10-15 years.

·      I see no prospect for a peaceful resolution of the dispute between China and Taiwan. China has grown more authoritarian over the last decade; more than any time since Mao ruled with an iron fist. In addition, neither the DPP nor the KMT would trust any PRC promises after what happened to Hong Kong. Indeed, I suspect that Taipei will seek to become less dependent on China as a source of cheap labor and as a market for its products wherever possible. One early indication of this is the microchip facility in Arizona. Despite all its startup problems, I anticipate you will see other companies strengthening ties with the US in this manner and exploring closer economic ties with Vietnam and others in ASEAN.

·      US support for Taiwan will remain strong. Indeed, the greatest danger is that some in the Congress or a future administration will tinker with the “unofficial” relations established in the TRA suggesting to the Chinese the US is inching back to a more official relationship with Taiwan. This is a clear red line for Beijing and could prompt an invasion. Based on this I would have advised Speaker Pelosi not to make a stop in Taiwan, but once China made such a fuss about a possible visit, I thought she had no choice but defy the Chinese threats. This one is on the PRC not the Speaker.

·      The US will maintain forward deployed forces in Japan and Korea with both Democrats and Republicans giving priority to Indo-Pacific affairs. They both see this as important to maintaining US national security interests. There is no interest, however, in creating a NATO-like organization. The emphasis will be on the current bilateral relations, active participation in ASEAN and the QUAD, and creating additional training opportunities for the militaries of the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia to work together.

·      China will continue to modernize the PLA and improve its capabilities to take Taiwan by force. Most worrisome is Beijing’s expanding its ICBM force from a few hundred warheads today to as many as 4,000 by 2040. Harking back to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and how nuclear brinkmanship limited US options could tempt Beijing in the future to reassess its ability to take Taiwan by force. Since I believe the US will respond appropriately to any new strategic threat from China and others such as Iran, Russia, and North Korea over this time frame, I still judge the odds for China choosing a military option as less than 25%. The complexity of an amphibious operation is so great and the consequences for China so dire win or lose, that unless provoked Beijing will keep its powder dry.

Xi Jinping, however, is the wildcard in my calculations. He is seeking a third term as President in November. To succeed he must convince other senior officials to change the Constitution: It currently limits a person to only two terms in office. Those who watch the political machinations in China more closely than I do predict Xi will prevail and at some point, could even do a Putin and declare himself President for life. He might also begin to feel the same legacy pressures many believe Putin felt in making a decision on the timing of the Ukraine invasion. If he did begin to focus on his legacy, it would provide an early warning indicator that Taiwan’s security could be in jeopardy and require me to quickly reassess my earlier optimistic predictions.